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Problem Solving in 
Labor Negotiations 
Retest of a Model 
Richard B. PETERSON 
Lane TRACY 
and 
Alan CABELLY 
Two tests of a model of problem-solving in labor negotia-
tions are reported, using samples of private-sector negotiations 
and in the Pacific Northwest. 
During the past 5-10 years a number of writers hâve dealt with the sub-
ject of integrative bargaining (problem-solving) in labor negotiations. Some 
of the literature has criticized labor union leaders in the United States for 
their reluctance to support quality of work life projects. For example, 
Myers (1971) criticized labor union officiais for their adamant position 
against job enrichment programs. Winpisinger, Président of the Interna-
tional Association of Machinists, has responded by stressing the point that 
union members place a low priority on such programs; most union members 
are interested in more concrète improvements such as better wages, hours, 
and working conditions (1972). Research by Kochan, Lipsky, and Dyer 
(1974) on local union officiais supports Winpisinger's position. Other union 
arguments against major innovations in this area include fear of cooptation 
by management as well as the fear that job redesign would force unions to 
give up hard-fought gains in contract language. 
Another stream of literature identifies ways that unions and manage-
ment can build a positive union-management relationship. For example, 
Shershin and Boxx (1975) emphasize the need for both sides to play down 
the adversarial position in favor of coopérative or conciliatory approaches. 
* PETERSON, R.B., University of Washington, Seattle, Wash. 
TRACY, L., Ohio University. 
CABELLY, A., University of Dayton. 
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Finally, the prépondérance of the récent literature in this area has con-
centrated upon spécifie problem-solving innovations. Some of the better 
known projects are the Expérimental Negotiated Agreement (ENA) in the 
Basic Steel Industry, the Scanlon Plan use in spécifie firms, the Rushton 
Coal Mine experiments, and the Jamestown, New York joint labor-
management committees. Thèse and other expérimental approaches hâve 
been outlined in various reports published by the Work in America Institute 
and the now defunct National Center for Productivity and Quality of Work 
Life (1976). 
What seems to be missing in ail of this literature is an attempt to 
separate and identify the situational variables that encourage problem solv-
ing in negotiations. Also lacking is any spécifie discussion of bargaining 
techniques that would facilitate problem solving. 
Our research has two spécifie objectives. On the theoretical plane we 
wish to develop and test a conceptual model of integrative bargaining devel-
oped in the earlier work of Walton and McKersie (1965). For the practi-
tioner we are concerned with identifying conditions, behaviors, and procé-
dures that enhance problem-solving approaches in labor negotiations. We 
hope to provide indications of situations or actions that help or hinder suc-
cessful integrative bargaining. 
The next section of this paper outlines and briefly discusses our concep-
tual model of integrative bargaining. The following sections discuss the 
method and the results from testing the model in two différent studies. The 
final section discusses the findings in light of theory and practice. 
THE CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
The conceptual model (see Figure 1) was developed (Peterson and 
Tracy, 1976a) prior to the two studies reported hère. The model itself de-
rives primarily from Walton and McKersie's integrative bargaining model 
outlined in their book, A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiation (1965), 
and from our earlier work (Tracy, 1971). However, other empirical studies 
reported later also support our hypothesized linkages. 
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FIGURE 1 
Model of Factors Affecting Successful Problem-Solving 
in Labor Negotiations 
Co-operative working relationship 
a. trust 
b. respect 
c. acknowledged legitimacy 
d. friendliness 
e. co-operative motivational orientation and action ten-
dency 
H1.0 
H2.0+^ 
Anticipated récognition and approval 
a. from fellow team members 
b. from constituents 
c. from opponents 
H3.0 + 
Professional orientation as a negotiator 
H4.0 + 
Long-established bargaining relationship between chief 
negotiators 
Successful 
problem 
solving 
H5.0 + 
Frequency of contact and openness of communications 
a. greater availability of information 
b. greater clarity of issues 
c. more exploration of subjects without commitment 
d. greater freedom from pressure 
e. more discussion of feelings and alternatives surrounding 
the issue prior to solutions being offered 
f. greater frequency of contracts between parties 
g. time horizon 
H6.0 + 
Team policy and administration 
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The model identifies six major independent variables that are expected 
to be positively related to the dépendent variable of perceived success in 
problem-solving. We define this dépendent variable as bargaining over pro-
blem issues in which both sides may gain from a good solution. This is a 
narrower définition than the one offered by Walton and McKersie (1965), 
who also include cases "when the gains of one party do not represent equal 
sacrifices by the other" (p. 5). We would expect more problem-solving ac-
tivity where both situations were tested; thus, our test is conservative. 
The model argues that perceived success in integrative bargaining is 
enhanced where (1) certain conditions are présent, and (2) certain pro-
cédures are used by the negotiating teams. While most of the variables relate 
to interorganizational relationships, some are of an intraorganizational 
nature. 
Below are listed the six groups of independent variables shown in 
Figure 1, with a brief description of the group. Each group of variables is 
hypothesized to be positively related to perceived success in integrative bar-
gaining. Thus, each group represents a numbered hypothesis. Literature 
support for each hypothesis is cited following the description of the group 
of variables. 
(1) Coopérative working relationship — a basic position in which the par-
ties are able to work together. Spécifie éléments include mutual trust, 
respect for competency of the other side's negotiators, acknowledged 
legitimacy of the other party, a modicum of friendliness, and a coopér-
ative motivational orientation. 
The most extensive research support relates to trust. Gruder and Rosen 
(1971), Gergen (1969), Frey and Adams (1972), Bonoma (1976), and 
Magenau et al (1976) emphasize the importance of this variable both for 
successful integrative and distributive (carving up the pie) bargaining. 
The Julian, Hollander and Régula (1969) research supports the need 
for mutual respect. Turk and Lefcowitz (1962) emphasize the crucial rôle of 
legitimacy. Friendliness is supported by the findings in the Swingle and 
Gillis (1968) and Johnson (1971) studies. 
Finally, coopérative motivational orientation is identified as probably 
the most gênerai factor. Research support is drawn from studies by Healy 
(1965), Blake and Mouton (1962), Walton and McKersie (1966), Pruitt and 
Lewis (1975), Bonoma (1976), and Driscoll (1978). 
(2) Anticipated récognition and approval — fellow team members, consti-
tuées, and members of the opposing team are seen as supporting the 
negotiators and their work. 
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Support for the importance of this variable in promoting successful 
problem-solving is found in studies by Stevens (1963), Druckman (1971), 
Vidmar (1971), Klimoski (1972), Frey and Adams (1972), Magenau and 
Pruitt (1979), Driscoll (1978), and Wall (1975). 
(3) Professional orientation as a negotiator — commitment of the nego-
tiator to bargaining as a full-time occupation. 
(4) Length of the bargaining relationship — length of time or number of 
times that the parties and/or negotiators hâve dealt with each other. 
Walton and McKersie (1965), and Urban (1971) provide arguments and 
data supporting the linkage between thèse variables and success in problem-
solving. 
(5) Frequency of contact and openness of communications — availability 
of information, clarity in stating issues, exploration of subjects without 
commitment, freedom from pressure, discussion of feelings and alter-
natives surrounding an issue prior to solutions being offered, frequency 
of contacts between parties, and time horizon or farsightedness of the 
parties. 
Literature support for using thèse various procédures is widespread. Repré-
sentative research and writings include Stevens (1963), Walton and 
McKersie (1965), Swingle (1970), McGrath (1966), Siegel and Fouraker 
(1960), Druckman (1971), Johnson (1971), Vidmar (1971), Contino (1968), 
and Healy (1965). 
(6) Team policy and administration — the bargaining team*s use of effec-
tive decision-making procédures and organization of work. 
The Balke, Hammond and Myers (1973) research offers one of the few em-
pirical tests of the importance of team policy on bargaining outcome, 
although it applied to a distributive bargaining situation. 
Before proceedings further, we should mention that the model does not 
include ail possible behavioral variables. Our latest research design includes 
additional behavioral variables. Furthermore, we hâve not included in the 
model some important économie variables (e.g. bargaining power, esti-
mated likelihood of a strike) that are expected to affect integrative 
(problem-solving) bargaining activities. 
METHOD 
The Sample 
The respondents were drawn from two sample bases of private sector 
chief negotiators for labor and management. The first group was drawn 
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from a nationwide sample and represented contracts covering 500 or more 
employées in the private sector (Peterson and Tracy, 1976a). The data were 
collected between May and October 1973. 
The second sample of private sector chief negotiators represented firms 
located in the Pacific Northwest (PNW). The prépondérance of thèse firms 
had a contract covering less than 500 employées. Thèse data were collected 
between mid-1976 and mid-1977. 
The data analysis for the nationwide sample is based upon usable 
responses from 65 (37 management and 28 unions) chief negotiators. Thèse 
65 negotiators represent feedback from sixty separate contracts. The Pacific 
Northwest data analysis draws upon usable responses from 47 (24 manage-
ment and 23 union) chief negotiators representing forty-one différent bar-
gaining agreements. In data analysis the samples were weighted to give 
equal weight to the responses of the management and union negotiators. 
This meant that the effective sample size for hypothesis testing was reduced 
to twice the size of the smaller group in each sample. 
The Questionnaire 
The chief negotiators in each sample were requested to complète two 
questionnaires. The first questionnaire was completed approximately 30-45 
days prior to contract termination. This information served as a pre- or 
early-bargaining base point. 
The second instrument, similar in nature but longer, was to be com-
pleted upon seulement or when an impasse was reached. The intent of this 
second questionnaire was to ascertain the conditions and bargaining pro-
cédures as perceived by the chief negotiators upon the completion of nego-
tiations. The analysis of the two questionnaires together was designed to 
ascertain the impact of conditions and behaviors on various measures of the 
outcome. 
The independent variables were divided into three groups: the existing 
state of the relationship during the very early stages of bargaining; percep-
tions of the behavior exhibited by both sides in the later stages of the nego-
tiations; and perceptions of the bargaining outcomes (Peterson and Tracy, 
1976a). 
There were at least two scaled questions for almost ail the variables 
contained in the conceptual model. The statements were deliberately mixed 
such that no two questions measuring the same factor were placed near each 
other. Half the scales had the positive end toward the right, half toward the 
left, and this was true within variables as well. Thèse design features were 
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incorporated into both questionnaires as a means of minimizing errors 
caused by response set, contiguity of questions and halo effect. 
We are reporting results using the summed independent variables, not 
the separate questions. The dépendent variable was measured by the ques-
tion: "How successful were the two negotiating teams in finding solutions 
to problems which adversely affected both parties1?" 
We used perceptions of successful problem-solving since there was no 
feasible way of objectively measuring either the amount or degree of success 
of problem-solving. Moreover, with respect to the décision making of the 
responding chief negotiators the important question was whether they 
believed that successful problem-solving had or had not taken place. 
The questionnaires used in thèse two studies were the resuit of pilot 
testing in four mock negotiation settings. Histograms, corrélation coeffi-
cients and factor analysis were employed as means of testing the clarity of 
questions, the distribution of variables and the strength of the relationship 
within and between variables. 
We tested the internai consistency of the summed variable scores in the 
nationwide study using the Spearman-Brown formula. The médian relia-
bility coefficient was .68 with a range of .29 to .87. The reader should keep 
in mind that the questions to be summed for each independent variable were 
not designed to measure exactly the same aspect of the variable. Had they 
been so designed, higher reliability coefficients would hâve been expected. 
We also factor analyzed the data from the nationwide study as a fur-
ther check on whether the questions we were using really grouped into fac-
tors as intended. The results generally supported the intended factor struc-
ture for most of the variables reported hère except availability of informa-
tion, freedom from pressure, and time horizon. 
RESULTS 
In this section we shall report the results of the testing of six hypothè-
ses. Most of the hypothèses were tested by means of 't'tests associated with 
Pearson product moment corrélations. The exceptions are Hypothèses 3 
and 4 where the noncontinuous nature of the data led us to use the F in 
analysis of variance test instead. 
i The British Journal of Industrial Relations article used the sum of this question and 
the "How successful were the parties at finding ways to improve the contract for mutual 
benefit?" question. The number of significant corrélations was somewhat higher in that 
analysis than for the use of the single dépendent variable used hère. In the PNW study, how-
ever, the second question was replaced by "How successful were the parties in finding solu-
tions to problems which adversely affected only one of the parties?" Thus, the question about 
solving problems that adversely affect both parties is the only question common to both studies 
that measured success in problem-solving. 
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Table 1 reports the results of the testing of Hypothesis I. Ail of the 
coefficients were significant at the .05 level in the nationwide study while 
only two of the five coefficients were significant in the PNW study. In that 
study the corrélations for two of the other three variables, legitimacy and 
coopérative motivational orientation, were in the predicted direction. Only 
friendliness showed a négative relationship. 
We now turn our attention to récognition and approval. Table 2 
reports the corrélation coefficients for récognition and approval from own 
team, constituents, and other team. While anticipated approval from con-
stituées was statistically significant in the nationwide study, récognition 
and approval from own team and the other team proved significant in the 
PNW study. Moreover, ail of the coefficients were in the predicted di-
rection. 
Hypothesis 3 relates to the expectation that the more professional the 
chief negotiators are, the more likely they are to engage in successful 
problem-solving. Professionalism was measured by whether negotiating 
was the respondent's primary job or not. Table 3 shows that the relation-
ship was not significant in either study. 
The next hypothesis is concerned with the relationship between ex-
périence of the chief negotiators and successful problem-solving. We reason 
that more experienced negotiators are likely to try, and be successful in, in-
tegrative bargaining more often due to an increasing sensé of compétence. 
Table 4 reports the results. Again, we find that the association is not sig-
nificant in either study. 
The fifth hypothesis identified certain bargaining procédures that are 
expected to increase the likelihood of successful problem-solving. Table 5 
reports the Pearson product-moment corrélations for each of the eleven 
variables. Seven of the eleven coefficients were significant in the nationwide 
study while only four of the eleven relationships were significant in the 
PNW study. However, with the exception of frequency of meetings to ex-
plore issues and team freedom (PNW only) ail the corrélations for both 
studies were in the predicted direction. 
The final hypothesis is that effective team policy and administration is 
likely to be présent where the parties hâve engaged in successful problem-
solving behavior. Table 6 shows that this linkage is significant in the nation-
wide study and approaches significance in the PNW study. 
TABLE 1 
Relationship Between Perceived Success in Problem-Solving 
and the Working Relationship Between the Parties 
Hypothesis number and subvariable 
1.1 Trust of other side 
1.2 Respect for other side 
1.3 Legitimacy of other side 
1.4 Friendliness of the relationship 
1.5 Motivational orientation and action 
tendencies 
Question 
— Honesty of other team 
— Trust toward chief negotiator of other team 
— Respect for chief negotiator of other team 
— Skill of negotiators on other team 
— Validity of other side's goals 
— Right of other side to make proposais its makes 
— Friendliness of people on the other side with you 
— Friendliness of people on the other side with other 
members of your team 
— Constructiveness of other side in compétition with 
your team 
— Degree to which other side tries to support or under 
eut your team's position with constituents 
* Pearson product-moment corrélation coefficient significant at the .05 level or better. 
TABLE 2 
Relationship Between Perceived Success in Problem-Solving 
and Approval from Team Members, Constituents or Opponents 
Hypothesis number and subvariable 
2.1 Favorable récognition and approval from 
own team member 
2.2 Anticipated favorable récognition and 
approval from constituents 
2.3 Favorable récognition and approval from 
opponents 
Question 
— Crédit given you during negotiations for your work 
and ideas from team members 
— Personal praise you received during negotiations from 
team members 
— Level of confidence in support from your constituents 
— Anticipated satisfaction of constituents with team's 
bargaining strategy 
— Crédit given you and your team members by oppo-
nents for work and ideas 
— Personal praise received by you and team members 
from opponents 
Success in problem-solving 
Nationwide PNW 
(N = 51-55) (N = 42-44) 
.201 
.250* 
160 
.316" 
.242 
.273* 
* Pearson product-moment corrélation coefficient significant at the .05 level or better. 
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TABLE 3 
Analysis of Variance of Perceived Success in Problem-Solving 
Between Levels of Professionnal Orientation 
Response 
Negotiating is primary job. 
Negotiating is part of duties, but not 
primary part. 
Negotiating is not part of regular duties 
Degrees of freedom = 63. F Score 
Nationwide Study 
Mean perceived success Standard 
N in problem solving déviation 
10 79.2 23.8 
46 68.8 21.8 
ti . 8 61.1 43.0 
1.18. Not significant at .05 level. 
Pacific Northwest Study 
Response 
Mean perceived success Standard 
N in problem solving déviation 
11 115.8 18.3 
33 121.6 27.4 
0 0.0 0.0 
Negotiating is primary job. 
Negotiating is part of duties, but not 
primary part. 
Negotiating is not part of regular duties. 
Degrees of freedom = 42. F Score = 0.40. Not significant at .05 level. 
TABLE 4 
Analysis of Variance of Perceived Success in Problem-Solving 
Between Levels of Length of Bargaining Relationship 
Nationwide Study 
Number of times chief negotiators 
hâve bargained with each other 
None 
Once or twice 
Three or more times 
Degrees of freedom = 57. F Score = 1.16. Not significant at .05 level. 
Mean perceived success Standard 
N inproblem solving déviation 
17 77.6 24.2 
13 65.6 30.0 
28 66.9 24.2 
Pacific Northwest Study 
Number of times chief negotiators 
hâve bargained with each other 
Only this once 
Two to four times 
Five or more times 
Mean perceived success Standard 
N in problem solving déviation 
15 110.6 24.9 
22 124.4 22.9 
8 126.3 31.6 
Degrees of freedom = 41. F Score = 1.60. Not significant at .05 level. 
TABLE 5 
Relationship Between Perceived Success in Problem-Solving 
and Frequency and Openness of Communications 
Hypothesis number and subvariable 
5.1 Public availability of information 
Availability of information from other side 
5.2 Ability of own side to clarify issues 
Ability of other side to clarify issues 
5.3 Exploration of subjects without com-
mitments 
5.4 Personal freedom from team pressures 
Team freedom from constituent pressure 
5.5 Discussion by own team 
Question 
Amount of information needed for problem-solving 
which was publicly available 
Freeness of other side in making available the infor-
mation needed by you to solve problems 
Clarity of your side in stating issues 
Specificity of your side in stating issues 
Clarity of other side in stating issues 
Specificity of other side in stating issues 
Degree of exploration by both sides of subjects on an 
informai noncommittal basis in negotiating sessions 
Degree that both sides got together outside regular 
bargaining sessions to explore subjects off the record 
Your freedom of constraints from members of your 
team 
Amount of initiative you were personally allowed to 
take in negotiations 
Degree of unawareness of constituents with what was 
going on in negotiations 
Freedom of your bargaining team from constituent 
pressure 
Level of discussion with other team of possible causes 
for problem before taking a position 
Success in problem-solving 
Nationwide PNW 
(N = 51-56) (N = 42-44) 
.254" 
.309" 
111 
12 
.006 
.212 .193 
.360* .228 
.336* .258 
.041 
-.083 
.073 
Hypothesis number and subvariable 
Discussion by other team 
5.6 Frequency of contacts between the parties 
5.7 Far-sightedness of own side 
Far-sightedness of other side 
Question 
— Level of discussion with other team of feelings about 
issue before taking a position 
— Level of discussion with your team of possible causes 
for problem before taking a position 
— Level of discussion with your team of feelings about 
an issue before taking a position 
— Number of grievance meetings in past year 
— Number of other meetings between parties in past 
year 
— Far-sightedness of own team with respect to future 
bargaining issues 
— Far-sightedness of own team with respect to future 
working relationship 
— Far-sightedness of opponents with respect to future 
bargaining issues 
— Far-sightedness of opponents with respect to future 
working relationship 
Success in problem-solving 
Nationwide PNW 
(N = 51-56) (N = 42-44) 
.415' 
.189 
.266* 
.406" 
.295' 
-.281' 
181 
.459* 
* Pearson product-moment corrélation coefficient significant at the .05 level or better. 
TABLE 6 
Relationship Between Perceived Success in Problem-Solving 
and Own Team's Policies and Administration 
Hypothesis 
6.0 Team policy and administration 
Question 
Effectiveness of own team's decision-making 
procédures 
Effectiveness of own team's organization of work 
Success in problem-solving 
Nationwide PNW 
(N = 56) (N = 42) 
.243* .235 
* Pearson product-moment corrélation coefficient significant at the .05 level or better. 
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DISCUSSION 
Having completed two tests of our behavioral model of problem-
solving in labor negotiations, we feel that we can draw some conclusions 
regarding the model. 
First, it seems apparent that such underlying conditions as trust, re-
spect, friendliness, legitimacy, and coopérative action tendencies are rather 
crucial for such success in integrative bargaining. While we did not test for 
causality, insights from the data and interviews leads us to believe that thèse 
are necessary pre-conditions for successful integrative bargaining (Peterson 
and Tracy, 1976b). 
Second, récognition and approval from own team, constituents, and 
the other side appear to hâve some importance, but are probably not as con-
trolling as the first five variables. 
Third, neither professionalism nor bargaining expérience of the chief 
negotiators appeared to relate to success in problem-solving. Walton and 
McKersie had expected a strong association. Why didn't it happen? One 
possibility is that our measures for thèse two variables didn't really tap the 
intended dimensions. For example, professionalism may not necessarily 
equate with negotiating being the respondent's primary job. Also, the ef-
fects of more expérience in dealing with one another may cancel out. By this 
we mean that more expérience can mean the development of the trust need-
ed to try new ways, but at the same time may lead the chief negotiators to 
employ a familiar pattern of bargaining approaches. 
Fourth, by itself, motivation to résolve a mutual problem is not 
enough. The chief negotiators need to use certain procédures to increase the 
likelihook that problem-solving will be successful. The importance of pro-
cédures was especially noticeable in the nationwide study. The most robust 
associations across the two studies were for exploration of solutions without 
being committed to a position, discussion by other team ofproblems before 
taking a position, and far-sightedness of other team. 
Fifth, effective team policy and administration appears to relate to suc-
cessful problem-solving. Intraorganizational relationships also are im-
portant. 
We found a somewhat lesser number of significant relationships in the 
PNW study than in the nation wide study. We feel that there are some plau-
sible reasons. One possible reason relates to bargaining unit size and assess-
ment of extent of problem-solving in the negotiations. Table 7 reports this 
data for the two studies. It is clear that (a) the PNW chief negotiators were 
involved in contracts covering fewer workers (as intended) and (b) that thèse 
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chief negotiators perceived less problem-solving taking place compared to 
their counterparts in the nationwide study even though more PNW nego-
tiators negotiated as their primary job. Furthermore, we surmise that out-
side expertise in the various problem areas was less available to the PNW 
chief negotiators. 
Secondly, the sample size in the PNW study was smaller than in the 
original study. There were some cases where the corrélations in the PNW 
study were somewhat higher than in the nationwide study, but due to 
smaller sample size the corrélation coefficient missed significance at the .05 
level. 
TABLE 7 
Size of Bargaining Unit and Character of Bargaining 
Size of Bargaining Unit 
1-499 Employées 
500-999 Employées 
1 000 and Over 
Not Reported 
Character of Bargaining 
Totally Distributive 
Generally Distributive 
Half and Half 
Mostly Integrative 
AH Integrative 
Nationwide Study PNW Study 
11 (16.9%) 40(85.1%) 
20 (30.8%) 4 ( 8.5%) 
28(43.1%) 1 ( 2.1%) 
6 ( 9.2%) 2 ( 4.3%) 
65 47 
Nationwide Study PNW Study 
3 ( 4.6%) 1 ( 2.1%) 
16 (24.6%) 10(21.3%) 
17 (26.2%) 18 (38.3%) 
21 (32.3%) 10(21.3%) 
8 (12.3%) 5 (10.6%) 
65 44* 
* Note: Three chief negotiators did not respond in the PNW study. 
The data in Table 7 suggest that chief negotiators in both studies hâve a 
différent way of categorizing character of bargaining behavior than is sug-
gested in most of the bargaining literature. This conclusion is borne out by 
the results of our interviews with 38 key negotiators in the nationwide study. 
Problem-solving doesn't necessarily require something like the Armour 
Automation Fund, West Coast Longshore Modernization and Mechaniza-
tion Agreement or the Expérimental Negotiation Agreement in Basic Steel. 
It may simply mean clarifying contract clauses that hâve caused both sides a 
lot of wasted time and energy in grievances. In this sensé, such problem-
solving may represent the mixed-motive strategy discussed by Walton and 
McKersie (1965, pp. 161-183). 
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What broader conclusions can be drawn from thèse two studies? Per-
haps the most important one is that Walton and McKersie and we hâve 
identified several variables that are associated with success in integrative 
bargaining (problem-solving) in labor negotiations. While two studies are 
not definite proof of most of the behavioral models, the gênerai consistency 
in results is indeed encouraging. What we hope to do in future research is to 
identify économie variables so that the model can capture more of the inter-
disciplinary nature of bargaining. 
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La solution de problèmes en matière 
de négociations collectives 
On cherche de plus en plus à découvrir des moyens de faire de la négociation 
collective un meilleur instrument en vue de la solution des problèmes qu'elle pose. 
C'est ainsi que l'on s'efforce de négocier certaines améliorations à la qualité de la vie 
en milieu de travail, d'établir des régimes de participation des employés aux bénéfices 
et la mise au point de méthodes destinées à accroître la productivité. Walton et 
McKersie (1965) ont soutenu qu'une négociation fondée sur l'esprit de compréhen-
sion exige le recours à certains mécanismes spéciaux comme, par exemple, de ne pas 
s'agripper à une position mais d'échanger des vues et des impressions au sujet d'un 
problème. La recherche indique que la confiance mutuelle et le respect entre les 
négociateurs est une condition préalable importante, si l'on veut résoudre un pro-
blème avec succès. 
Peterson et Tracy (1976a) avaient conçu et vérifié antérieurement un modèle de 
solution des problèmes en matière de négociation collective. Cette première vérifi-
cation se fondait sur un échantillon de 65 chefs négociateurs choisis dans toutes les 
régions des États-Unis qui négociaient des conventions collectives pour des groupes 
moyens ou considérables, la plupart de plus de 500 salariés. La présente étude vérifie 
le modèle de nouveau à partir de données fournies par 47 chefs négociateurs qui par-
ticipaient à la négociation de conventions collectives dans des unités plus petites, la 
plupart de moins de 500 salariés dans la région du nord-ouest Pacifique. 
On a comparé les résultats des deux enquêtes. Les conditions ou les comporte-
ments des parties à la négociation qu'on a relevés et qui se recoupent dans l'une et 
l'autre études, concernant les succès obtenus dans la solution des problèmes, repo-
sent sur la confiance mutuelle et le respect entre les négociateurs, l'exploration des 
questions qui se soulèvent entre les parties d'une façon informelle et diplomatique, la 
discussion des causes des problèmes et de l'opinion qu'on s'en fait avant de prendre 
une décision ferme, une certaine prévision au sujet des enjeux futurs des négociations 
de même que des relations actives et suivies entre les parties. En dernier lieu, l'étude 
porte sur les résultats des deux enquêtes. 
